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A Poor Choice of Words And An Idea Whose Time Has Yet to Come
James J. Tritten 1
With the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, a revolution in
military affairs, has focused arms control attention in major
countries primarily on strategic and other nuclear weapons.
Limiting conventional forces, naval weapons, and other aspects of
naval warfare has been largely ignored but show signs of life.
Euphoria over the recent U.S.- USSR intermediate-range nuclear
forces (INF) arms control treaty, "glasnost," "perestroika, " the
new Soviet defensive military doctrine, and both Western and
Soviet anxiety to reduce - or at least curb - the growth of
military expenditures, is shifting attention to conventional,
naval, and other forms of arms control.
Despite the rather extensive record of arms control, specif-
ically arms control between the superpowers, proponents of
"naval" arms control appear to be reinventing the wheel. They
ignore the rich lessons of previous non-maritime endeavors and
the enormous literature on the subject. From advocate pronounce-
ments, getting a treaty appears their goal, rather than the
standard benefits attributed to arms control.
The arms control community reached consensus in the early
1960s on three basic goals of arms control. First, the likeli-
hood of war should be reduced because of reduced military capa-
bilities and a reduction in the fear over a first strike. Second,
if war breaks out, the limited availability of weapons should
reduce the consequences of the war. Third, there should be a
reduction in the costs of maintaining military forces because of
limitations on weaponry, personnel, and/or operations.
These criteria should be used to assess the worth of past
agreements and any suggested arms control measures. A treaty or
the lack thereof, are not serious measures of the effectiveness
or success of a nation's arms control efforts. Further, if these
goals can be attained without a treaty or other formal arrange-
ment, then negotiations would appear unnecessary. Proponents of
"naval" arms control should make their case for such controls on
the likelihood of a suggested measure meeting these goals, for
they are not being met by other means.
Some of the most recent arms control initiatives for the sea
services, their possible consequences to naval operations, and
restrictions on the development of future maritime technology,
are the subjects of this paper. It focuses on "naval" arms con-
trol initiatives in three main areas proposed by supporters:
restrictions on strategic antisubmarine warfare and similar
measures to "safeguard" strategic nuclear ballistic missile
submarines at sea; limitations on naval operations on the high
seas; and regulations regarding specific maritime antisubmarine
warfare technologies. The paper also address the timing of these
arms control initiatives, their priorities in national security
affairs, and whether naval forces should be subjected to controls
in the absence of analogous controls over nuclear and land
forces. It is these important questions that I first address.
The Poor Timing of Recent Arms Control Initiatives
Perhaps the most important message in this paper is that,
even accepting the value of arms control over the sea services,
this is singularly the worst time since World War II to engage in
such negotiations. Accepting the subordination of military
doctrine and strategy to policy is the key to understanding this
argument
.
The Changing Soviet Union
The U.S. and NATO have, for the past forty years, focused
their political-military planning and arms control efforts mainly
on the most dangerous nation they faced, the Soviet Union. Until
recently, the USSR was fairly predictable; there were well-artic-
ulated programs and policies in the open literature, the Soviet
force structure matched those declaratory policies, and exercises
and deployments reinforced both. Trends over time indicated a
deliberate and fairly constant defense doctrine and military
strategy.
(>
The West needed to watch only a few Soviet spokesmen whose
open-source programs and platforms were relatively consistent.
We could (and did) ignore the government and party leaders of
Eastern European countries, and even the Soviet government, to
watch what the Soviet party and military leadership said. We
generally ignored the internal debates within the party and
military and concentrated only on the outcome of the debates;
usually a major policy statement by the most senior party and
military leaders involved, the fielding of a new weapons system,
or a deployment of forces. We watched programs and force employ-
ments follow official policy, with few mismatches. We assumed,
that fielded capability represented the final expression of
intent.
That world is gone and is unlikely to return. President
Mikhail Gorbachev has shifted real political power from the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) , and its elite Polit-
buro, to a new Presidential Council and the government of the
USSR. The CPSU is considering surrendering its constitutional
right to rule the USSR, and communist parties in Eastern European
nations no longer hold power. Few care anymore who heads the
communist parties in Eastern Europe. Did anyone predict this
might happen one year ago?
Is may not even matter who heads the CPSU next year.
Contingency planning in the West must include the possibility
that the Soviet Union, as we know it, will eventually break up,
and multiple international states take its place. We need to
analyze "what happened to treaties entered into by federations or
similar unions, later dissolved into discrete political actors.
After the 1917 Revolution, the Bolsheviks repudiated all Tsarist
treaties. Can we be assured that a naval arms control treaty
with a Soviet government headed by President Gorbachev will be
binding on an independent Lithuania? This is not a mere academic
point, since future independent Baltic republics may inherit some
units of the former USSR's Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet or the
border patrol forces.
The West has not had to consider major changes in the Soviet
party leadership and programs since World War II. Although the
abrupt changes we are witnessing appear for the better, we must
consider that future changes in leadership and programs may be
for the worse. In 1933, the government of Germany underwent a
major change. Up until then, marginal cheating on arms control
agreements by Germany were taken seriously but did not cause
significant alarm. After the 1933 change in government, marginal
cheating proved downright dangerous to the stability of the
world's democracies. Even if we believe that changes in the
USSR are leading to a better world, the West must hedge its
strategies for a possible reversal. Such strategies must address
the minor noncompliance of arms control agreements that even
friendly nations demonstrate.
Even if the USSR survives relatively intact, there is a new
legislative oversight committee within the Supreme Soviet, the
Committee on Defense and State Security, with cognizance over
security and defense. The committee is not totally a rubber
stamp for President Gorbachev, nor a parallel to either the U.S.
Senate or House Armed Service Committees. This embryonic in-
volvement by the legislature is already changing the smooth
running of the Soviet "military-industrial complex."
President Gorbachev has opened the realm of national de-
fense to individuals who have not been major participants. For
example, in July 1988, a major conference was held on the future
international security environment and how it would effect the
Soviet Union. Most interesting was that this conference was
sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not the Ministry of
Defense. 5 Not too many years ago Soviet civilian strategic
nuclear arms negotiators were not given force structure data by
the Soviet military since they did not have a "need to know."
Academics from various institutes in the USSR have always
written about defense matters but the West could (and did) gener-
ally ignore them since there was little correlation between this
literature and Soviet military literature, deployed hardware,
actual exercises, and deployment patterns. Today, the most
extraordinary articles by a wide variety of civilian academics in
the institutes appear to provide close correlation between their
articles and where the Soviet military appears to be heading.
In open source literature, there is significant opposition to
civilian academics from the Soviet military. From the tone of
the debate, it appears that the military has lost influence and
clearly resents the external meddling from this new crop of
McNamara-style "whiz-kids."
Five years ago, few in the West would have taken the civil-
ian literature very seriously, unless it was corroborated by
military evidence. Today we see the Soviet Chief of the General
Staff resorting to writing in his own in-house newspaper to
communicate what he would have said, if allowed to speak, at a
February 1990 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. 6
In short, there is a new cast of characters running, or
participating in running, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It
is not clear how long they will remain in power, and how much
power each of these actors can exert. My point is that we are
witnessing a major restructuring (perestroika) of real political
power in the USSR, and it is not certain (July 1990) to whom we
should be listening.
For example, when Georgi Sturua, from the USSR Institute of
World Economy and International Relations, told a Western audi-
ence in June 1990 that the Soviet Union is no longer interested
in "naval" arms control because inter alia it has more important
things to do, does this presage a new government policy? For-
merly, conformity to a strict "party line" was the norm and we
would assume that Sturua was authorized to float a trial balloon.
The West will now have to debate whether Dr. Sturua is an author-
ized spokesman and seek corroboration that government (or party)
policy is changing. We will also have to evaluate the positions
of other nations still nominally in the Warsaw Treaty Organiza-
tion and not assume that their positions parallel those of the
Soviet government or CPSU.
*
Even if we assume that President Gorbachev will remain in
power beyond the next two years (he declared he would resign if
his economic reforms did not show progress within that time) and
Georgi Sturua is wrong (the Soviet government still wants to
negotiate a "naval arms control" agreement with the U.S.), this
is the wrong time to deal with third or fourth order issues such
as "naval arms control." There are more important things to be
settled.
The Changing International Security Environment
Another primary reason to avoid a major maritime arms con-
trol agreement is that we are in the midst of a major and stress-
ful restructuring of the international political and security
environment. We do not know what that world will look like, but
it is likely to be less bipolar and more multipolar than was
common in the past forty-five years. We intuitively "know" that
navies will be used for certain tasks but those tasks are set in
the context of an international security and political environ-
ment undergoing major changes.
Political scientists have been predicting a changed world
for many years. Today, we are actually watching Soviet troops
pull out of Eastern Europe; the U.S. government (not just a few
legislators) is seriously considering recalling all combat troops
from Western Europe; and a proliferation of other threats that
have not been taken seriously for years are now receiving atten-
tion at the highest levels of the U.S., Soviet, and European
governments
.
If we are to consider threats other than the USSR seriously,
we must understand the same things about the rest of the world
that we did about the Soviet Union when the U.S. Navy publicized
its Maritime Strategy. It took the United States much time and
effort to avoid the mirror-imaging problems and develop the capa-
bility to assess Soviet views on war, strategy, and employment of
navies as well as time to develop its own strategies.
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No intelligence service today can claim it understands the
views on war, and the role of navies, of the rest of the world.
That remainder, incidentally, has at least as many submarines as
the two superpowers. Until we understand how navies might be
used in future armed conflicts and crises that do not involve the
USSR, it is difficult to design strategies for their employment,
let alone force structures and operating requirements.
Likely, we will need to devise radically different military
scenarios for crises and war, not only wars and crises in Europe;
scenarios to which we (and the Soviets and Europeans) are not
accustomed and have not thought through. Until new national
objectives and strategies have been conceived and tested, why
should anyone even consider restricting fleet capabilities?
If the world coastal states were unwilling to restrict
superpower access to their shores by suturing international
straits when the territorial sea was extended to twelve nautical
miles, why should we assume that they would want to deny access
by restricting superpower maritime capability? A major reason
these nations ensured access despite a new Law of the Sea Treaty
was so that if they wanted a superpower fleet off their shores,
it would have no trouble getting there. My point is: these same
coastal states may still feel that way and not want to see re-
strictions on superpower naval operations or capabilities. We
should ask them.
If both superpowers return their ground forces to their
homelands, war planning (it will go on) may more resemble that of
the inter-war years than the Cold War. The 10-day war, or bolt
for the Rhine will be less interesting scenarios than long (1-2
year) mobilizations by totalitarian nations matched by the halt-
ing, inadeguate responses by democracies. War planning will
focus not just on the few scenarios that have enraptured us for
the past forty-five years but may include contingencies for which
all major nations lack sufficient specialist cadres within gov-
ernment .
It is possible that democracies will no longer engage in a
zero-sum game with the CPSU because the public repudiation of
peaceful coexistence as just another form of the class struggle
is real. If we can relinguish the zero-sum game mentality, then
we should examine very seriously a series of comprehensive pro-
posals for a new international security environment proposed by
President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. 9
This should be our first order effort, not control of naval
forces, operations, and maritime technology.
A New Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy
Another first order issue is that we know that the military
policy of the CPSU has been radically altered making the preven-
tion of war a most serious goal of Soviet military doctrine.
Soviet and Warsaw Treaty Organization military doctrine has been
altered and openly published. Even if the CPSU loses its consti-
tutional guarantee of leadership of the USSR, whatever government
follows will retain a similar strategic culture. It likely would
formulate a military policy and doctrine that is similar; i.e. a
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non-communist USSR or a number of independent republics from the
former USSR would not casually embark on a confrontational for-
eign and military policy with the West.
There were debates in the Soviet Union over this new mili-
tary policy and the supportive defensive military doctrine.
Subsequently, changes were made to Soviet military strategy - the
strategy governing the employment of their fleet. The changes
in doctrine and strategy appear real and they do matter. We are
witnessing significant changes in ground force structure, deploy-
ments, exercises, and concomitant changes to the Soviet military
literature at the strategic and operational levels of armed
conflict. These changes will affect Soviet government plans to
use its military forces (including naval forces) in peace, crisis
(period of rising tensions) , war, and the termination of a crisis
or war.
From the available evidence, at least four variants for
defense of the USSR were openly debated. The first was the
traditi6nal active defense with forces fighting on enemy territo-
ry at the groups of fronts level in a theater strategic offensive
operation. The West understands this variant of defense and had
responsive intelligence, military, and political programs to
ensure the peace.
The second variant was modeled after the historic 1943
Battle of Kursk, which included superiority over the enemy but
allowed the enemy to strike first and wear himself out. The ini-
tial defense would be rapidly followed by a lightning counterof-
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fensive at the groups of fronts level, transferring the theater
strategic operation to enemy territory. The problem with variant
two is that the force structure and eventual offensive capability
are virtually identical to variant one. The West would be no
more secure under this option, even though the associated doc-
trine and strategy are "defensive."
The third variant is modeled after the fourth period (July
10, 1951 - July 27, 1953) of the Korean War, or the 1939 Khalkin
Gol operation in Manchuria against the Japanese. Under this
model, Soviet forces would have the defensive capability to
defend their own territory (even actively but only at the tacti-
cal and operational levels) and repel an invader but not to go on
the offensive at the groups of front level and fight on enemy
territory. Victory is limited to the tactical and operational
levels of warfare and the counteroffensive is only at the front
level. Such a variant would significantly change planning by the
Soviet military and the perception of the threat by the West.
One unanswered question is, how long would military operations
remain at this relatively low level before full mobilization took
place and other options presented themselves?
In a November 1989 interview, Marshal of the Soviet Union
Sergei F. Akhromeyev, military advisor to the current Chairman of
the Supreme Soviet, stated specific views on crises or war termi-
nation which might provide insight on the timing of initial
defensive operations limited to repulsing an invader to the
Soviet border. Akhromeyev implied that the defensive role during
the initial period of a future war, would allow the political
12
leadership the opportunity to terminate it. Failing that, the
military would be unleashed to perform their normal function of
crushing and decisively routing the enemy (emphasis added): 1
"The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact
states that the first large-scale operations
that we may engage in will be of a purely
defensive kind, aimed at repelling aggres-
sion. I think that these operations will
last long enough - they may last several
weeks . We imagine that during this period
the Warsaw Pact political leadership will
take steps aimed at localizing the conflict
and preventing the unleashing of a full-scale
war . However, if it does not become possible
to resolve the conflict by employing politi-
cal means, then it is difficult at the
present time to imagine how events would
develop. Both sides would develop their
armed forced in accordance with their plans
for wartime."
A fourth variant of defense suggested that the attacker
would simply wear himself out but Soviet forces could not even
repel the invading army. This variant was not taken seriously
since it was decidedly non-Russian, non-Soviet, would preclude
victory at even the operational level of warfare, and would
result in war termination with an invading army on Soviet terri-
tory.
Apparently, the third variant has been chosen and this
change in doctrine and strategy is significantly changing the
requirements, and roles and missions, for the Soviet Navy. We
are just beginning to understand the multiple meanings of these
new war termination words (above) by Marshal of the Soviet Union
Akhromeyev and it may be some time before the Soviets conclude
their analysis of all aspects of the strategy and operational
art.
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The dramatic changes in doctrine and strategy cause commen-
surate debates over the roles and missions of the Soviet Navy.
Any discussion of "naval" arms control would put the cart before
the horse. What do the Soviet government (or party) and marshals
want their fleets to do in the event of a crisis or war? Even
they are uncertain.
Under old Soviet military strategy, there were four basic
strategic missions for the Soviet Armed Forces; (1) strikes,
primarily by nuclear missiles, (2) military operations in a land
theater, (3) defense of the nation from enemy strikes, and (4)
military operations in naval theaters. The fourth strategic
mission (maritime) was always considered indecisive and thus the
Soviet Navy was always the fifth rank military service.
Evidence suggests that the strategic missions of the Soviet
Armed Forces have been restructured; (1) repelling enemy aero-
space attack, (2) suppression of enemy military-economic poten-
tial, and (3) disruption of groups of enemy forces. 11 It is not
clear if these new missions are official Ministry of Defense
missions, yet the West has no choice but to take these new
strategic missions seriously and assess how the Soviet Navy fits
into them.
Figures 1 and 2 present the results of my original analysis
that attempts to fit standard Soviet fleet missions into the
traditional and possibly new strategic missions assigned the
Armed Forces of the USSR. It is not clear whether the debate
within the USSR over service roles and missions is settled, hence
14
these figures may be only a snapshot of the Soviet Navy's posi-
tion, circa Spring 1990.
It does appear, however, that the Soviet Navy may have
actually increased in importance, which explains the lack of
serious cuts in its force structure while major cuts are sched-
uled and/or occurring in strategic nuclear and ground forces.
Analysis of either Figure 1 or 2 is a useful starting place to
move from political goals in a war or armed conflict to major
military missions, and understand how each Soviet military serv-
ice will be used. Both Figures 1 and 2 show the connection
between military operations/actions at the strategic level of
armed conflict and combat operations/actions at the operational
and tactical levels. Original Russian words are in parentheses,
where appropriate, to ensure that the reader can correctly place
key phrases in this diagram. 12
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The Soviet Navy's strategic role in modern war between the
superpowers, where global operations were assumed relatively
brief and perhaps nuclear, was considered generally limited to
threatening nuclear missile strikes from protected bastions. 13
Protecting the bastions would consume a major portion of the
Soviet surface and subsurface fleet, operating in a defensive
role but engaged in offensive tactics. Another important strate-
gic mission for the Soviet Navy has traditionally been to assist
the Soviet ground forces in theater strategic operations ashore.
Recently, the Soviet Navy was tasked with an increased role
in defense of the nation against enemy strikes from the sea, a
role they share with the Soviet Air Defense Troops (PVO) . Mili-
tary operations on the high seas has been a long-term and basi-
cally unfunded goal due to a cultural conceptual bias and misun-
derstanding of navies by the leadership of the Soviet Armed
Forces and CPSU. It remains an unmet need unless one assumes that
the aircraft carriers currently being built constitute the core
of an offensive maritime force.
t>
The Soviet Navy's discussion of these new strategic missions
may be an attempt to revise the widespread lack of appreciation
for the maritime sector by the marshals and generals and to
explain once again how maritime forces can be used to achieve
political goals in armed conflicts. What should be very clear,
however, is that with service roles and missions being revised,
there should be no negotiations over naval force structure or
operations until that debate has ended. If the Soviet have not
settled how they intend to use their Navy in war, why should we
18
feel comfortable limiting our own capabilities to match any
expected threat. Set into the context of simultaneous major
economic and political upheaval in the USSR, the wisdom of even
thinking about "naval" arms control is open to serious question.
Ongoing Arms Control Negotiations
There are additional major second order reasons for not
engaging in arms control for the sea services at the present
time. Most important is the lack of agreement on nuclear arms
control negotiations, let alone successful ratification of any
treaty by the U.S. Senate (the last strategic nuclear treaty was
never ratified and it never entered force) . The complex rela-
tionship of nuclear forces and capabilities to conventional, and
especially naval, forces is a topic on which I have written
elsewhere and will not repeat.
I would emphasize that we must first successfully conclude
our bilateral strategic nuclear force arrangements, and see them
ratified, before engaging in conventional naval negotiations.
For example, how many ballistic missile submarines will be de-
ployed, and will each superpower continue to program forces
capable of attacking these submarines in the conventional phase
of a war? Are there symbiotic force employment options precluded
by cutting conventional naval forces? Nuclear issues are second
order questions that immediately stem from aforementioned politi-
cal ones. They are of more importance than "naval" arms control
and must be settled first.
19
An additional reason to delay maritime arms control is that
it is now obvious that conventional land and ground forces are
undergoing drastic restructuring in Europe and may themselves be
the subjects of a successful arms control agreement in the near
future. Will all Soviet troops return to the homeland? Will the
USSR actually adopt variant three as the programming and war
planning model? Will the U.S. and Great Britain bring their
troops home from the continent? Does France leave troops in the
united Germany? What type troops are found in the former German
Democratic Republic? Will the German-Polish border question be
resurrected? What happens if the Czech and Slovak Federal Repub-
lic and Hungary become neutral and withdraw from the Warsaw Pact?
These are all very important second order questions that need to
be settled before considering the role of navies in future wars,
let alone negotiating limits to our maritime options.
Unarticulated U.S. and NATO Goals
The U.S. and NATO are changing their basic strategic-military
focus. "Just as the Soviet military appears to be behind the
curve on articulating future direction, the U.S. defense estab-
lishment is currently (June 1990) fighting a catch-up game with
Congress. The American legislature, going through its normal
tortuous budgetary processes, will create its own version of
American strategies and priorities because it was not offered
realistic choices by the executive branch of government.
When the Congress completes its budget actions and the
President signs the appropriate legislation, the executive branch
20
will open the planning process with an evaluation of the re-
sources available, and guidance on goals and objectives provided
by the legislature. The Department of Defense staffs will then
begin designing new national and national security goals, objec-
tives, and strategies. By then, the U.S. should have a more
perceptive appreciation of the comprehensive threat. Arms con-
trol should follow this process, not precede it.
Changes in Planning Assumptions and Scenarios
The likelihood of war in Europe is lower than it has been
for many years. Both sides can actually change their planning
assumptions and count on strategic warning measured in months,
not on the tactical warning of an attack of only a few hours or
days. These changes are not insignificant and they affect naval
forces. We have not begun to appreciate the changes that major
increases in warning times will have on sealift and fleet re-
quirements. These implications should be understood before we
confine ourselves to a box that may prove poorly designed, once
we understand the new international and military environment.
Naval forces do not exist in isolation. They must have
relevance and value in what occurs ashore. However, for the near
term, we are essentially incapable of deciding what we would like
to do ashore, or even what a war might look like, given the new
Europe. If we cannot settle these first order political and
second order military questions, then why should we consider
major modifications to lower order forces that, if changed in the
wrong manner, might seriously affect our ability to influence
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what goes on ashore - once we finally agree on what we would like
to do there.
The full spectrum of "other" threats need additional re-
search and alternative solutions and force structures debated.
For example, do we resolve the threat of an oil disruption by
continuing to invest national treasure in a military (especially
naval, sealift, and Marine Corps) capability designed to seize or
defend the oil by force or by filling the strategic petroleum
reserve and supporting alternative sources and conversions?
Congress is unlikely to do both over the long haul, nor should
they.
With the demise of old threats (from both the Western and
Soviet perspective) , maritime specialists must consider fundamen-
tal questions to justify existing programs. For example, U.S.
submarines have generally been justified in terms of the Soviet
threat. If that threat is no longer taken seriously, can we
justify submarines with other missions such as naval diplomacy,
and have them available in case the Soviet conversion changes
again? Similarly, certain classes of Soviet submarines and
their modernization of older models have been justified in part
by the need to interdict mid-ocean sea lines of communication.
In the new world of defensive defense with both superpowers
essentially back in their homelands, it becomes more difficult to
justify such offensive forces.
Although no one has a monopoly on predicting the future
force structure and operating budgets for the U.S. Navy, it is
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safe to predict that the sea service will be cut but proportion-
ally less than the other services. With the reduced force struc-
ture, the U.S. will then call on the Navy to meet and cope with a
host of other threats that were ignored while we concentrated on
the USSR.
From the Western perspective, it would appear that a conti-
nental power like the USSR, especially a land power embracing a
defensive doctrine and strategy, does not require certain types
of naval forces. Although that is obvious even to some Soviet
civilian strategists, aircraft carriers are still being built,
modernization continues of the submarine fleet, and newer surface
ships are generally more capable than the ones that they replace.
This does not make sense to the West and demands further investi-
gation - prior to negotiating any arms control regime.
Technical Criticism of "Naval" Arms Control
I now turn to certain specific proposals for the control of
maritime forces which I intend to rebut based upon their techni-
cal merits. My general argument is that, in addition to being an
extraordinarily poor time to engage in naval forces negotiations
for the aforementioned reasons, the major proposals floated are
all fatally flawed. In short, despite the very good reasons to
avoid maritime arms control negotiations now , navies may have to
explain why the proposals themselves are shallow and faulty.
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Restrictions on Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare
Some academic community civilians question certain offensive
operations termed "strategic" antisubmarine warfare (ASW) or ASW
operations against strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile-
carrying submarines (SSBNs) . Proponents suggest that arms con-
trols regulate such operations. Proposals to restrict deployments
of SSBNs and limit strategic ASW have been around for decades,
attracting the support of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and,
more recently, CPSU General Secretary and President Mikhail
Gorbachev with a supporting cast of military officers and foreign
ministry spokesmen.
Most of these proposals create "safe zones" in which SSBNs
can be deployed. Within these zones all ASW operations would be
forbidden. Hence such zones would restrict virtually all war-
ships, hydrographic vessels and naval auxiliaries from operating
in vast areas of the high seas since it could be argued that even
during routine transit by these ships they conduct certain (and
not trivial) phases of antisubmarine warfare. For example, ships
i»
transiting the ocean normally conduct visual and radar (if
equipped) search - both forms of active ASW. Even passive search
using basic electronics equipment is expected during the most
routine and innocent transits, and most naval ships carry some
electronic support measures (ESM) equipment. ESM, radar, and
visual search are surprisingly effective and routinely used
methods of ASW.
Safe zones would logically restrict ASW research (scientific
study of the environment that could advance ASW technology or
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capability) as well as actual ASW operations; otherwise, a major
loophole would allow treaty circumvention and non-compliance. If
a nation claims it is doing only ASW research off a port from
which SSBNs routinely sail, not actual ASW operations, it is
likely that this research might result in the "unintended" con-
duct of actual ASW against a significant target. Even if no SSBN
sailed in the area while research was being conducted, the re-
search would significantly enhance the ability of the "enemy"
nation to conduct ASW if it were to abrogate the agreement bar-
ring such restrictions.
Virtually all military ships conduct ASW "research" during
normal transit - fathometer soundings, bathythermograph readings
and other routine observations on the condition of the seas.
These soundings, readings, and other observations may sound
trivial to the land-oriented individual, but they are crucial to
the conduct of ASW, especially in shallow waters. Therefore, a
ban on ASW research essentially means a ban on the passage of any
warship "capable of conducting these basic readings, or virtually
any warship.
If ASW safe areas cause difficulties for warships, we should
consider the difficulties similar restrictions place on fishing
vessels and merchant ships. All Soviet ships are state-owned. In
the West, many civilian ships are contracted for military related
support services; hence, any visual or radar searches, fathometer
soundings, bathythermograph readings, sea state recordings, or
studies of marine biology by these ships must be considered
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state-run or sponsored ASW operations or research. An ASW free
zone, therefore, would have to be off-limits to any state-owned
or contracted merchant or fishing vessel.
Forbidding vast areas of the ocean to transit by national
flag vessels is clearly not in the best interest of either super-
power or any maritime nation. How would the U.S. fishing, oil,
and minerals industries react to being told they could not con-
duct routine ocean observations or exploration in the Gulf of
Alaska? How would the Canadian government feel if it was forbid-
den to send coastal patrol vessels into the Arctic regions out-
side its own territorial sea or internal waters?
Analyzing such an arms control regime, verification problems
abound. Should the West wish to demonstrate that the Soviet Union
is not complying with ASW restrictions or restrictions on the use
of "safe" areas, but can do so only by exposing its own sophisti-
cated technical or intelligence capabilities, it must choose
between exposing the non-compliance and the related intelligence
source 6r not publicizing the violation. Unfortunately, democra-
cies have a poor track record, generally choosing not to publi-
cize "minor" violations, thus inviting totalitarian nations to
take even further liberties with treaties.
Even if compliance can be verified, the net effect of any
restrictions on strategic ASW or SSBN operations benefits the
Soviet Union more than the West. In effect, the restrictions de-
mand that the West identify the ocean areas in which its strate-
gic missile-carrying submarines are deployed, something we now
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avoid at all costs. Identification of deployment areas to desig-
nate ASW free zones greatly eases Soviets ASW search problems.
Simply put, we would greatly reduce the large oceanic area where
the Soviet Union looks for U.S. SSBNs. If we identify search
areas for SSBNs, we probably weaken Western deterrence, including
the deterrent umbrella extended by the U.S. over its non-nuclear
Allies.
The U.S. has never built the maximum number of SSBNs allowed
under the SALT I agreement. As we reduce further the number of
SSBNs, it is in our and our Allies interests to keep the Soviet's
search problem as complicated as possible, as a hedge against the
long-predicted Soviet breakthrough in ASW. Although many politi-
cal scientists warn us that the oceans are about to become trans-
parent (that scientists will discover a means to make ocean
waters so clear that submarines hidden beneath the surface will
be visible from the skies) , this breakthrough is still not immi-
nent. Soviet military strategy, however, explicitly requires the
use of strategic ASW against enemy missile-carrying submarines in
time of war. We should maintain our guard against a possible
Soviet breakthrough in ASW capability.
Any reduction of SSBN hulls in the future has three possible
implications of major importance. First, substantially reducing
the number of targets for Soviet strategic ASW action is a prob-
lem that must be constantly monitored by government intelligence
agencies assessing enemy ASW warfare capabilities. If we reduce
the number of SSBNs to 17 or 18, using a rule of thumb that two-
thirds of that force might normally be on patrol, then the Sovi-
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ets and their allies would have to search for only 12 targets
during normal peacetime patrols. Similarly, if Soviet SSBN num-
bers are reduced significantly, this will have an effect upon
planned maritime operations in war and, therefore, in the planned
procurement of ASW capable forces in the West in peace.
Second, if Soviet SSBNs are reduced, the Soviet Navy will
likely have surplus general purpose (submarine, surface and air)
forces to send into areas of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in
time of war. Similarly, the reduction in the number of SSBNs in
the West might have an impact in both our planned buy of cruise
missile-carrying forces and conventional antisubmarine warfare
forces necessary to defend convoys against threats from these
extra Soviet forces.
Third, no future arms control agreements with the USSR
involving nuclear weapons should accord them a unilateral advan-
tage in using ballistic missile submarine hulls nor exclude the
diesel-electric ballistic missile submarines and intermediate-
it
range naval land-based nuclear cruise missile forces currently
found in the Soviet Fleets. The USSR was granted unilateral
superiority in SALT I submarine hull and launcher numbers due to
supposed technological inferiority. That mistake must not be
repeated since their technological "inferiority" at sea has been
vastly overstated (or at least is no longer as valid) and long-
range missiles make unnecessary their firing off the shores of
North America.
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Just as the possession of nuclear weapons by third nations
is an obstacle to strategic nuclear and other arms control nego-
tiations, the possession of missile-carrying submarines and ASW
forces by other nations complicates any of the general purpose
"naval" arms control proposals mentioned. For example, would the
United Kingdom or France deploy their SSBNs in the open ocean if
the U.S. and Soviet Union limit their submarines to safe zones?
If so, the survivability of these Allied submarines is question-
able since they will have to face greater numbers of Soviet ASW
forces directed specifically at them. The U.S. generally takes
the position that it cannot and will not negotiate Allied nuclear
forces while the Soviet Union views all weapons that are capable
of hitting its homeland as "strategic."
Similarly, if Soviet ASW forces are not allowed to enter the
U.S. ASW-free or "safe" areas, will North Korean or Cuban forces
be used instead? If the USSR breaks up shortly after the signing
of a treaty, will ships flying the flag of the Ukraine or Belo-
russiya (currently U.N. members) be bound by any agreement of the
old USSR? Reflagging is an ancient maritime tradition, used to
reduce the effectiveness of any arms control regime, making
treaty compliance virtually impossible to enforce. If reflagging
is not used, what prevents nations from benefiting from the ASW
or ASW research conducted by its allies? Allies could act as
sub-contractors to ensure continued mission performance even in
the face of an arms control regime.
My point is that any bilateral agreement involving ASW is
basically a non-starter. There are too many ways of circumven-
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tion to achieve the desired results. If this type of agreement
is desired, it must be comprehensive and involve all nations
legally capable of deploying a navy.
In addition, any arms control limitations on antisubmarine
warfare will reduce the opportunities for collecting intelli-
gence, an element of our national technical means (NTMs) of
verifying compliance with arms control agreements. Most people
eguate NTMs with satellite activities. Naval forces, however,
have the rights of transit and intelligence gathering on the high
seas. If sea operations are restricted, banning the use of radar,
visual and ESM "ASW" search equipment, these same naval forces
might not be able to undertake necessary observation missions
verifying the arms control treaty itself. Most proponents of
"naval" arms control do not understand the adverse effects their
proposals would have on monitoring current agreements. If they
did, they would not favor these proposals.
Most arms control proponents also do not understand the
nature of military operations at sea and are more comfortable
with land warfare. At sea, sailors live in an environment where
shades of gray are the norm and black and white are much more
difficult to identify discretely. It is for this reason that
navies are normally given more latitude in rules of engagement
than land forces.
Navies normally deal with "possible," or "probable," rather
than "certain" submarine contacts. 17 The false alarm rate is
extraordinarily high at sea and the risks of poor judgment are
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more often catastrophic than for forces ashore. To extend arms
control to the sea services, we would have to devise special
procedures and regimes to deal seriously with the less than
"certain" contacts which, if proven valid, would verify noncom-
pliance with rules.
From the failures of the Swedish government to openly de-
clare intrusions into their internal waters and territorial sea
to be Soviet in origin, it is likely that governments will demand
certain verification of noncompliance. In other words, we will
need a smoking gun or "Whisky on the rocks" (an actual Soviet
submarine aground in Swedish waters) to "prove" that a nation is
not living up to its international obligations.
Navies are not likely to favor eroding their power and
influence in what is, until now, clearly their prerogative. If a
"possible" submarine is detected off the coast of a nation, it is
duly recorded and logged by military officers and intelligence
professionals of relatively low rank. If asked by the govern-
ment, the armed forces or intelligence services can tell their
government how many "possible," "probable," or "certain" subma-
rines are, or were, off their shores at any given time. If
questioned by the public or the media, the government would use
the military's input as the basis for their answer, with due
caution respecting intelligence sources and methods.
If the waters off that same nation, however, were declared
an ASW free zone, or an otherwise restricted area, as part of a
formal arms control regime the government had sponsored, then the
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government is more likely to take their military's or intelli-
gence service's input and apply both legal and political finesse
to ensure that they report no submarines found in forbidden zones
even though in the absence of an arms control regime, the report
would be precisely the antithesis. Still, one could conjure up a
case where a government of the opposition party might attempt to
discredit an arms control agreement negotiated by its predeces-
sor, and manipulate intelligence data to show high levels of non-
compliance.
Navies cannot be expected to support any changes to the
current agreements where professionals are allowed to make judg-
ments on their own, without legal or political oversight. The
case in point is the Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar, which had been
identified by the intelligence services and the military as being
an antiballistic missile (ABM) radar. It was eventually acknowl-
edged by the Soviet Foreign Minister to be an ABM radar but the
issue was tied up for years by arms control proponents who argued
that it was not a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. If declared
an ABM radar, it would undermine the arms control process, hence
proponents would not call it an ABM radar.
Restrictions on Naval Operations
Other Soviet recommendations for "naval" arms control in-
clude restricting major maritime exercises to one or two each
year. Asymmetries in national methods of attaining fleet readi-
ness underlie this proposal. The Soviets believe they maintain
high readiness by maintaining an alert status in port or at an
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anchorage, not exercising their fleet at sea. Virtually all other
navies believe readiness is maintained by maximizing the time
they are underway at sea conducting operations. Restricting at-
sea time might appear attractive to a new Administration anxious
to lower Department of Defense budgets by reducing operating and
maintenance costs; however, limiting exercises while suitable for
continental powers like the Soviet Union, are clearly impractical
for historic sea powers like the United States, the United King-
dom, France, or Japan.
In addition, proposals to limit the number, location of
deployments, or types of forces have been suggested by the USSR.
For example, the deployment of a battleship into the Baltic Sea
caused an adverse reaction by a Soviet spokesman. Deployed air-
craft carrier battle groups near the Soviet homeland are anathema
the Russians would also prefer to regulate. Fortunately, we have
a historical record of Soviet non-compliance with naval arms
control, especially the Montreaux Treaty of 1936. Although one
can argue that the USSR has not violated the exact letter of the
treaty, a political document subject to interpretation of the
government of Turkey, the record highlights a nation that has not
been faced any restrictions it would not find a way around.
Proposals on specific ship deployments, besides being asym-
metric and self-serving, have two major flaws. First, they under-
mine the principles of navigational freedom so vital to our mili-
tary forward deployment strategy and economic well being. I
believe navigational freedom is more important to the U.S., its
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Allies, and trading partners, than any benefit we may derive from
limiting fleet deployments by the Soviets. Second, deployment
limits undermine deterrence, especially of our major Allies on
exposed flanks. Major fleet task forces of the U.S. Navy remain a
visible deterrent to Soviet aggression in the Norwegian Sea and
Eastern Mediterranean and as a reminder of our commitment to
defend the exposed flanks of Iceland, Norway, Greece and Turkey.
If the Soviets desire a reduced U.S. naval presence in these
areas, they must be prepared to give up something of equal value.
Soviet proposals for zones of peace, or nuclear free zones
at sea, are additional long standing proposals detrimental to
NATO maritime strategy that would adversely complicate U.S. Navy
operations. Such zones lend themselves to large regional varie-
ties, such as a zone of peace for the Indian Ocean or, in more
limited geographic areas, like the Baltic Sea. Aggregated on a
map, they virtually encircle the Soviet Union providing it a
defensive buffer. National defense is a laudable goal for any
nation, and we appreciate a genuine Soviet desire to maintain its
security. However, peace zones and nuclear free zones are ele-
ments of the Kremlin's wide-ranging fragmentation tactics under-
mining regional, hence global, stability by excluding the U.S.
and Western sea powers from vital areas - even if achieved one
small step at a time. A map of the world with the Soviet Union
at the center shows zones of peace naturally complementing the
already overwhelming zones of active and passive defenses that
encircle that nation.
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There has been a modicum of success with nuclear weapons
free zones, space being a case in point. Space, however, is not
free of nuclear material. Are we to believe that nuclear powered
satellites cannot be "converted" into nuclear weapons by flipping
the toggle switch of a control panel on earth? Similar concerns
need addressing before a nuclear weapons free zone is discussed
regarding the open seas.
One of the best examples of a zone of peace is the demilita-
rization of the Great Lakes by the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817.
Seldom mentioned, however, is the general disregard for this
treaty's specific provisions since the American Civil War. How
many Americans realize that the U.S. Navy had training aircraft
carriers in the Great Lakes during World War II? The Rush-Bagot
Treaty clearly illustrates that nations settle their political
differences first, then sign arms control agreements in which
technical or even significant violations are meaningless while
the political climate remains comfortable. "Naval" arms control
advocates should concentrate on the probable need to renegotiate
this treaty with a divided Canada rather than suggesting "naval"
arms measures between the superpowers.
Zones of peace, or nuclear free zones at sea, would also
tend to undermine the NATO strategy of flexible response, which
includes options other than immediate escalation to a major
nuclear war if NATO faces conventional defeat on land. Retaining
a full spectrum of war fighting options, including the ability to
initiate limited nuclear war from the sea, remains in the best
interests of NATO under the present terms of reference for the
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Alliance. Nuclear free zones are generally proposed in areas
that would make this option more difficult.
If the Soviets are fearful of Western naval capabilities and
anxious to conduct serious negotiations, they should offer a quid
pro quo of value. Soviet naval forces are neither central to
Soviet decision-making nor an appropriate quid pro quo for reduc-
tions in the U.S. Navy. Soviet rail and road systems have been
suggested but an even better asymmetrical reduction could be
land-based first strike missiles that undermine the U.S. deter-
rent forces. If the U.S. felt more secure over its missiles and
bombers, it would feel less compelled to sustain forces to attack
Soviet SSBNs during the conventional phase of a war. Why do the
Soviets need first strike missiles with a defensive military
doctrine?
Restrictions on Technology
Other Soviet arms control proposals include limiting the
technological development of strategic ASW. This proposal assumes
we can somehow distinguish between "strategic" ASW and "tactical"
ASW - tactical ASW characterized as hunting and eliminating
submarines not carrying ballistic or long-range cruise missiles.
Obviously, feckless proponents of this cavalier idea have little
operational sea experience.
Attempting to regulate strategic antisubmarine warfare
technology without imposing similar restrictions on operational
or tactical antisubmarine warfare technology is neither practical
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nor in the best interests of NATO nations. If the success of NATO
defense strategy depends upon the reinforcement/resupply of
Europe from North America in a conventional war, then the Allies
will require the most advanced ASW warfare techniques to sail
convoys across the Atlantic. If the U.S. and the U.K. remove
combat troops from the continent, and NATO maintains its essen-
tial function, then the alliance will be even more dependent upon
secure sea lines of communication. In contrast, The Soviet Union
can fight in Europe without relying on vulnerable sea transporta-
tion and are thus in a better position to sustain ASW technology
restrictions.
Similar arguments can be made regarding other threat areas.
If the United States and NATO nations would like to maintain a
forced or even a benign access capability to other areas in the
world, then they must ensure that materials and supplies trans-
ported by sea can arrive with but minimal threat from submarines.
There are some two hundred submarines afloat that do not belong
to the world's superpowers.
If we agree to such restrictions, and accept increased vul-
nerability of our seaborne shipping, will arms control advocates
agree to increase the capabilities of intercontinental air trans-
portation and defense of the air ways? Probably not. Their likely
recommendation would be to regulate air transportation as well,
leaving us with no certain way to ensure that men and material
can cross the open seas!
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How can we even attempt to regulate the development of ASW
technology so that it will be used to find only submarines not
carrying strategic nuclear missiles? How can we regulate the
passage of warships or state-owned merchant ships through the
high seas and ensure that they are not searching for submarines
when they must locate other ships to avoid collisions? How can we
ensure that the Soviet Union will comply with such restrictions
and what will we do if we discover one of their fishing vessels
has reported sighting one of our submarines? The U.S. cannot
gamble on surrendering its lead in ASW (or other) technological
developments by agreeing to any such restrictions in a future
arms control regime.
Restrictions on antisubmarine warfare technology will also
demand unrealistic requirements for intelligence collection. How
do we monitor Soviet laboratories? We cannot, with certainty,
claim that we could detect noncompliance with restrictions on
technology. If developing certain types of weapons or intelli-
gence collection systems comprises the measure of effectiveness
for ASW technology, and using history for a guide, then the
legalistic strict constructionist USSR will simply develop alter-
native unregulated devices to achieve the same results.
There is a significant lesson here concerning actions re-
garding ballistic missile defense taken by the Soviet Union -
despite ABM Treaty provisions. Most people in the West believe
defense against ballistic missiles was outlawed by this Treaty.
Intelligence collection concentrated on inspection measures of
ABM defense as specified by the Treaty. We did not examine prolif-
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eration and mobility of missiles and hardening of silos - alter-
native and unregulated means of defense against ballistic mis-
siles. Thus, the Soviets achieved ballistic missile defense
through methods not regulated by the treaty while the U.S. simul-
taneously gave up the goal of serious ballistic missile defense.
The Goals of Arms Control
Arms control does not alone connote the signing of treaties.
Worthwhile arms control agreements should accomplish at least one
of the following: reduce (1) the likelihood of war, (2) the
consequences of war, and/or (3) costs. These measures should,
however, be integrated into a national security policy related to
the national security of our Allies. Costs to the American
taxpayer and the Soviet government should likewise be reduced as
Allies and former Allies increasingly assume a larger share of
their overall defense burden.
A typical example used by lax and indifferent arms control
enthusiasts to "demonstrate" the advantages of naval arms control
is the Washington Naval Arms Conference. The conference placed
major constraints only on building then-"strategic" weapons -
capital ships and aircraft carriers. There were no regulations
concerning submarines and only limited restrictions on construc-
tion of other warships. The monetary savings by the U.S. achieved
in the 1920s not building capital ships was offset by expenses of
the 1930s naval arms buildup. Can we seriously argue then that
the Washington Conference met any of the three fundamental goals
of arms control? Of course not. Is the record any better if we
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add the naval arms control provisions of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, the 1930 and 1936 London Treaty and the 1935 Anglo-
German Naval Agreement? No. None of the inter-war years naval
arms control efforts met the three major objectives of arms
control.
A major lesson learned from previous naval arms control
agreements, however, is that they not only limit necessary prepa-
ration for deterrence, but also deter democracies from exposing
totalitarian nations openly violating such agreements. During the
inter-war period, Germany, Italy and Japan built many warships
exceeding limits set forth in arms control and other treaties, a
fact actively hidden by at least one major democracy. For exam-
ple, Britain actually had an Italian cruiser in its Gibraltar
drydock, weighed it, found it in excess of a 10,000 ton treaty
limit, and hid their findings. 9 In another case, the Admiralty
continued to record the incorrect and treaty-compliant tonnage
for the German battleship Bismark even after it was sunk and the
Royal Navy's Intelligence Division had examined the ship's logs
?o
and surviving crew.
The record of all arms control is poor at best. The public
is frequently confused by proponents who insist that adherence to
a treaty is more important than ensuring the security of the na-
tion. Technical debates over verification demand a great deal of
attention with little or no thought ever given to ensuring com-
pliance with the agreement. Verification is not the problem. I
generally argue that we can verify non-compliance to a level that
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would be accepted by an intelligence specialist. Compliance
(politics) is the problem! What do we do the first time a Soviet
submarine "inadvertently" strays into an ASW free zone? What do
we do the fifteenth time it happens, since it is more than likely
that we will do nothing the first time? Does it matter if the
submarine strays in 1 mile or 100 miles; or for 10 minutes or 10
hours? Democracies always promise to expose violations (and do
not always) and assume they will have strategic warning of any
"significant" violations allowing rebuilding and rearming - which
they rarely do until too late.
What Can Be Done Today?
First Steps
Actions are being taken to attain the real objectives of arms
control. The exchange of military academicians is a useful and
necessary first step. The USSR must help the West understand its
new defensive military doctrine and strategy, and the internal
debates over these issues. We must be assured that their doctrine
and strategy are no longer based on offensive war-fighting con-
cepts against the West designed to limit damage to the USSR by
first-strike operations against U.S. forces. Military officers
of both countries should continue to write on doctrine and
strategy in each other's professional journals. Similar writings
by civilian academics should also be encouraged.
Time alone will convince the U.S. that the new Soviet doc-
trine and strategy are supported by correlative force structure
and deployment. We need to understand that the best way to deal
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with the Soviets is to treat them as they see themselves, rather
than in some theoretically "rational" manner that makes sense
only to a civilian academic. We should not consider "educating"
the Soviet military to different concepts of deterrence (they
understand and reject our concepts) but rather deal with the
Russian mindset on terms it respects.
Though the U.S. would like to see the concept of military
vulnerability to strategic nuclear strikes accepted by the Soviet
military and political leadership, so that the West can decide
that Mutual Assured Destruction ("MAD") has finally been accepted
as military doctrine by the USSR, it is up to the Soviets to
demonstrate by both word and deed that their past behavior and
policies have changed. Instead, the Soviets continue to repudi-
ate deterrence theory and the vulnerability associated specifi-
cally with MAD and actively pursue measures, including those at
sea, to defend their homeland against strategic nuclear strikes.
As a first step in accepting MAD, and settling first order
questions first, the USSR can dismantle its most threatening
first-strike intercontinental ballistic missiles or cease deploy-
ing new land-based mobile missiles that might cause the U.S. to
counter with similar systems. These would be the first steps in
the move to arms control of forces at sea, since our ability to
accept regulations at sea depends largely upon what happens on
land.
Each superpower must recognize that its views of a logical
deterrent posture might appear threatening to the other side.
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Existing Soviet land-based ballistic missiles that directly
threaten our Minutemen and Peacekeeper missiles; an extremely
robust defense against bombers and cruise missiles; a commitment
to ballistic missile defense, and an aggressive ASW research and
development program; coupled with what we know was Soviet mili-
tary strategy, are viewed by the West as aggressive measures
toward capturing overall military superiority rather than merely
providing a "reasonably sufficient" defense. Recent purported
reductions in excessive Soviet military general forces capabili-
ties and overseas deployments are significant unilateral confi-
dence building measures and a step in the right direction but
mere words are simply not enough.
The continued excessive capability in Soviet submarines and
their new capability in aircraft carriers do not appear to the
West to logically support a defensive doctrine and strategy. If
General Secretary Gorbachev indeed had power to make significant
and unilateral reductions in ground forces, even below what was
being negotiated, why does he not pick up the phone and cancel
construction of the new aircraft carriers and more modern offen-
sive submarines?
Each side must monitor with extreme care the external images
that its rhetoric, force structure, deployments and exercises
portray to the other. Right now, there is a mismatch between
naval forces and overall Soviet military strategy. The Soviets
can make a case for the aircraft carriers under a defensive
doctrine but it is equally true that they do not need such capa-
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bilities and could perform the same missions with helicopters and
land-based aviation. The enormous costs, size, and continued
modernization of their undersea fleet staggers any logical at-
tempt to comprehend it as a "defensive" force.
The recently publicized unilateral "reductions" in older
Soviet fleet assets (obsolete ships and "harbor queens") has not
been a serious arms control step at all. These "reductions"
result in a leaner but meaner navy force structure. 21 If theo-
ries about deployments of ballistic missile submarines closer to
the USSR are correct, the area of responsibility for sea control
by the Soviet Navy decreases. Decreasing areas to be controlled
coupled with a more efficient force structure, could increase the
combat potential of the Soviet Union, albeit in a reduced area.
When increased combat potential is viewed in relation to Soviet
attempts to reduce the threat from the sea with arms control (a
traditional Soviet measure to deal with the threat) , we can see
that the overall correlation of forces would improve in favor of
the USSR and its security would be enhanced. 22
If the West, or President Gorbachev, takes seriously the
possible secession of republics from the USSR, then a first order
"naval" and general arms control unilateral step is to plan for
the orderly transfer and denial of military capability to the new
independent republics. If the Ukraine becomes an actual inde-
pendent republic, who controls the SS-19 intercontinental ballis-
tic missiles and the associated nuclear warheads at the Derazhnya
missile base? 2 Are there Soviet Navy nuclear weapons in Lithua-
nia, and will these be kept by the Russians or will nuclear pro-
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liferation be allowed? Is there a need to once again plan for
Allied intervention in the Soviet Union to ensure the security of
critical military hardware? Do we have procedures for Western
intelligence agencies to communicate with the KGB if they uncover
an impending loss of nuclear weapons to other armed forces within
the Soviet Union?
Advocates of "naval" arms control need to wrestle and re-
solve the major problems subsumed in all of the above proposals
before Soviet recommendations are taken seriously by the U.S.
Additionally, they must consider a number of intrinsic questions
discussing the technical details of specific proposals. For
example, one of the most important considerations is, do the
restrictions remain in place during an armed conflict? There are
treaties and conventions that regulate the conduct of war and
armed conflict and, by and large, these agreements govern during
armed conflict. Do "naval" arms control proposals such as ASW
free zones, etc. remain in force during a war or armed conflict?
Can the "nations of the world even agree on what constitutes a war
or armed conflict?
The definition of war and armed conflict is likely to prove
as elusive as a totally satisfying definition of a warship or
innocent passage. There is still major disagreement between the
nations on whether Coast Guard and KGB forces, national revenue
service, auxiliary, or gray-painted merchant marine units (in-
cluding those under charter to a military service) are, or should
be, classified as warships. Similarly, despite years of histori-
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cal precedents, treaties, and some notable international court
cases, the right of innocent passage by warships through the
territorial seas of another nation has yet to be settled to
everyone's satisfaction.
If superpowers can agree on definitions, their next move may
be sharing war gaming and political/military simulation and
analytic capabilities to hasten agreement on the impacts of
proposed arms control restrictions. Such simulations would be
necessarily guarded but they might prove prudent opportunities to
understand how each side views military problems. More impor-
tantly, they might aid each side in developing measures of effec-
tiveness needed to model the behavior of the other nation. These
are all analogues of what must be done before major proposals for
the regulation of arms at sea should even be discussed.
What Navies Might Risk
Even now there are some modest arms control measures that
can be pursued, clearly peripheral measures that do not involve
major or central military weapons systems. I would suggest that,
at a minimum, all major navies and general staffs should be
looking into these issues in case their governments demand par-
ticipation in arms control negotiations. The following measures
are assessed as less hurtful than more restrictive regimes cur-
rently being proposed.
The existing seventeen year old bilateral incidents-at-sea
agreement, and recent high level meetings between the military
staffs of the superpowers appear as constructive moves to mini-
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mize potential crises arising from military operations and maxi-
mize communications on a professional level. These agreements
could be signed on a bilateral basis by all major sea powers,
with eventual negotiation of a multilateral agreement open to all
maritime nations. Expanding the incidents-at-sea agreement to
include non-interference with submarine or aircraft operations
might also be examined and evaluated.
Open exchange of non-sensitive data, such as the names,
classes, and homeports of major ships, can also be non-threaten-
ing to the U.S. Navy since this data is generally known. It
might be nice to have an official list of all Soviet fleet units
with their current status (active, reserve, decommissioned, moth-
balled, etc.), actual name, ship rank, and home fleet. Current-
ly, this information is obtained by each side from intelligence
sources. If we can exchange similar data for strategic nuclear
forces (and even more for theater nuclear) , why not build confi-
dence by understanding each other's naval force structure? Per-
haps it" would help the West understand just how many of those
innocent looking merchant type ships in the Soviet inventory are
actually naval auxiliaries, and not "civilian" noncombatants
.
Although nuclear free zones or zones of peace may not neces-
sarily be in the West's best interests, they represent a reasona-
ble fallback position should Western navies be strongly encour-
aged to engage in "naval" arms control by insistent governments.
Simply put, it is far better to promise to not deploy nuclear (or
other) weapons in specific geographic locations than to not build
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them at all, if you feel that nuclear weapons are central to
deterrence. Should the agreement fail, it is easier to recover
from the former than the latter. It would also be useful to see
exactly which areas of the world's oceans the Soviet government
is willing to tell its Navy that it can no longer inhabit. Let
Admiral Chernavin fight this issue with his own government - not
deceitfully make this a U.S. Navy vs. the world issue.
Another concept worth exploring is no first nuclear use at
sea. I believe it is not in the interest of the U.S. Navy, or
any Western navy, to fight a nuclear war at sea. The Soviet
Union probably would benefit most if it were to go nuclear and
launch the first strike at sea, yet it promises not to go nuclear
first. If the U.S. or NATO promises to not go nuclear first at
sea, and ties the deterrence of nuclear war at sea (as it does
now) to a threat to expand the war to shore, then this would
probably be reasonably acceptable to our own and NATO strate-
gists. Still, the principle of flexible response would be under-
mined. Given the current events in Europe, we might accept more
risk and be less explicit about our means of deterrence.
Perhaps the U.S. Navy could suffer the loss of some of its
tactical nuclear weaponry at sea, which is what we are doing
anyway. Although it might be argued that this reduction should
be a part of an arms control regime instead of a unilateral
budgetary or programming action, I believe that unilateral
reciprocal steps made by each nation is the better way. While
doing away with nuclear weapons at sea, we must guard against too
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deep reductions, which could affect our war-fighting needs or our
deterrence of tactical nuclear war at sea.
The disposal of naval nuclear reactors is another topic that
might be scrutinized since it is in the best interests of all
governments and navies to ensure that this is done safely and
with minimal environmental impact. Although not a specific step
to control naval arms , it is a useful first step and confidence
building measure.
Agreements on the notification of ballistic missile tests,
and on the prevention of dangerous military activities, were
recently signed by the superpowers. Perhaps we can agree as well
on advance notification of major naval exercises. Notification
might be limited to those which the other side finds most threat-
ening, such as flushing of all Soviet SSBNs from port to deployed
bastions, or conducting a fleet-size ASW exercise by NATO in
waters close to the USSR. Although advance notification clearly
undermines the principle of freedom of the seas, if navies are
asked to accept some restrictions, it is better to promise to
notify prior to an exercise rather than to have the exercise
canceled for lack of governmental support.
Past experience, but with advance notification of exercises
regulated by the existing Helsinki and Stockholm accords, should
form the backdrop for negotiations. If we already exchange in-
spectors because of the Helsinki and Stockholm agreements and the
new INF Treaty, why not exchange additional data during major
exercises, or challenge inspections which are likely to be ob-
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served in any case by these inspectors? It should be to both
side's advantage to receive these inspection reports right.
Nations may even risk open confirmation that some of their
major warships do not carry nuclear weapons. Currently, nuclear
capable navies neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence
of such weapons aboard their bases, ships, aircraft or vehicles.
Yet U.S. Army and Air Force denials to other countries that bases
or forces are nuclear capable are commonplace, albeit on a gener-
al and not specific basis. As a start, the Soviet Union might
confirm that its non-gray painted, civilian-manned, merchant-type
ships that are actually naval auxiliaries - and therefore war-
ships under the Law of the Sea Treaty - do not carry nuclear
armaments when they visit European or Asian ports to obtain
consumables for Soviet fleet units. Again, let us make this a
problem for the Soviet Navy to deal with and keep the Western
navies out of the press on the issue.
A final area into which we might have to look is permissive
action links (PALs) . PALs must receive an active signal to fire
of a nuclear device. PALs are found on strategic bombers and in
the system to launch land-based intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles. Although generally impractical for our SSBNs (and an
emotional issue for the crews involved) , how have we accepted
this principle with sea-based cruise missiles? PALs are one more
component that might break down, or be targeted for interference.
They thus provide another opportunity for ballistic missile
defense and strategic ASW for the Soviets. Yet, might we not
compromise and accept PALs rather than risk more degrading meas-
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ures? Would the West not feel more secure, should the Soviet
government or CPSU prove incapable of future governance, if
Soviet SSBNs could not fire without such a device? To ensure that
this is the case in the now unstable USSR, it may be worth the
price of inserting PALs on Western SSBNs.
The Case Aga inst Stonewa 1 1 inq
The U.S. government must develop non-threatening positions
on arms control, minimizing any possible impact on our fleets to
perform peacetime and wartime missions. To do that, the govern-
ment and the Navy needs to participate in the debate as an active
partner. Arms control for the Navy has no merit, is not a good
idea, and we must ensure that the fleet is not emasculated by
well-meaning proponents of "naval" arms control.
The fleets of the world are being hobbled and undermined
substantially by budgetary reductions, yet navies understand that
they must be a major participant in that process, to minimize the
unctuous intemperate actions of the normal political process.
Navies cannot run the risks of having governments concur in arms
control decisions without the discerning expert counsel of the
leaders of the sea services. From without, it might appear that
the leadership of the U.S. government and Navy is afraid of arms
control and either will not or cannot partake in the debate for
fear of bureaucratic ineptitude or inarticularity . These are
difficult and unpalatable for the Navy but so are budget cuts.
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If the U.S. Defense Department and Navy remains aloof from
the debate, it is possible that a new model will develop for
military participation in politics. This new model is prevalent
in other nations; a model wherein academics and the politically
aware public debate issues, influencing the government through
elected officials and decision makers, with the bureaucracy
expected to enforce these decisions. Rightly or wrongly, the
U.S. military is an active participant in political debate. Is
the Department of Defense or the Navy willing to surrender par-
ticipation in that debate and not present convincingly any insti-
tutional opinions? I suggest that there are such ministries of
defense and navies in the world and that the U.S. ought not to
proceed down that specious path.
The U.S. should get the Soviet Navy involved in the arms
control process to clearly identify their preferences. We might
learn that the Soviet Navy shares many of the same reservations
about arms control that the U.S. government does. Unfortunately,
the debate as now structured points to the U.S. government, and
especially the Navy, perceived as the only obstacle to a sea
services agreement between the superpowers. Let us put Admiral
Chernavin in the spotlight and explain publicly why he is either
in favor or cutting aircraft carriers or submarines or not. Let
the internal Soviet debate, for a change, include what the Sovi-
ets are willing to give up instead of what they want from the
West.
We must disclaim the perception that the U.S. is stonewall-
ing on arms control, if only to ensure that the train does not
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leave the station without the fleet. Fortunately, the Navy is
involved in serious internal staff work on all these issues and
will be well equipped to respond to policy questions of the next
few years. Navies should not float outside the mainstream polit-
ical process involving possible arms control but must explain
frankly and in uncomplicated terms to those more comfortable with
military operations ashore why certain concepts are not transfer-
able to the sea services. It is not up to the land-oriented to
learn about the sea but rather for the fleet to explain its
special circumstances to others.
Most importantly, we must think through the "naval" arms
control issues and move ahead of the Soviets in more effectively
handling the press, while informing the Western and American
public of the issues involved. Well-founded alternative proposals
should be presented by active-duty naval officers with help from
civilian academic personnel and arms control supporters. The U.S.
cannot refuse to participate in the "naval" arms control debate.
Conclus ions
The issues involved with "naval" arms control suggestions,
discussed herein, demonstrate the growing complexity of modern
warfare. Neat distinctions between the offense and defense or
even nuclear and non-nuclear warfare and warfare in one theater
are almost meaningless without consideration of the remainder of
the equation. If warfare is this complex, it is obvious that we
cannot consider arms control with such outmoded concepts as
regulations involving only certain areas of the world, or certain
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types of weapons systems. From an intellectual perspective, all
future crises and wars between the superpowers will be both
automatically global and nuclear. In some of them, the crisis or
war will have not expanded to a new area of confrontation and,
optimistically, in all of them the nuclear weapons have not yet
been used.
In the absence of a comprehensive global arms control re-
gime, I doubt whether it is wise or even possible to single out
specific regions where naval operations should be regulated by
new arms control measures. Naval forces are global and strategic
and should be considered in their totality. In other words,
geographic arms controls or those limited only to the superpowers
or limited regions are not a good idea.
Naval forces, alone, should not be subjected to arms control
measures lacking an outcome of political events in Europe, con-
trols over nuclear forces, and the arms control process regarding
land forces in Europe. The fleet does not exist for its own
sake. Navies exist to affect events ashore and what is occurring
ashore these days is major. Perhaps the best thing that naval
officers can do is explain why we should not even use the term
"naval" arms control.
A meaningful arms control agreement involving naval forces
must be accompanied by a comprehensive plan regulating virtually
all nuclear and non-nuclear forces and activities, and involve
all nations, not just the two superpowers. Any nation currently
allied with the U.S., and any nation desiring the option of
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future aid from an American fleet, has a major stake in ensuring
that the Soviets do not restrict U.S. maritime operations.
I believe the current or projected nuclear, or maritime,
balance of forces between the U.S. and USSR both in the any
single region and worldwide, is not so severe that immediate arms
control is needed. Wars do not begin by events at sea. The two
superpowers are adjusting to new technological opportunities and
political realities and need time to attain mutual understanding.
It is an affection, capricious and fashionable in the U.S.
and the West, to think of arms control in terms of a "non-zero
sum game," in which one side gains no advantage over the other.
However, the long history of arms control and the international
political relations between nations teaches us, that arms con-
trol is a part of an overall national security strategy and
properly belongs in the "zero sum game" camp. There one side can
indeed gain an advantage over another. Arms control strategy is a
competitive strategy where one side should be expected to gain an
advantage over the other.
Where to start the arms control process? On the one hand,
strategists often start with some concept of the threat. The
strategist then tries to deal with this threat given the objec-
tives assigned and the resources available. On the other hand,
the arms controller often starts thinking about a sub-goal
(usually a treaty) generally ignoring major goals (such as na-
tional security) , the resources available, and threat. Both arms
control enthusiasts and strategists are now being forced to begin
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the process differently: with the output of the budgeter and
legislatures - the resources available and not necessarily re-
sponsive to the threat or the goal. Good planning must enable
the process to start anywhere, and not consider attainment of a
sub-goal the culmination of the planning process.
Before we consider major agreements for the sea services, we
should identify and settle the first- and second-order political
and military questions. On the Soviet side; what structure will
emerge from the crumbling political empire created by the commu-
nist parties; who is in charge of the USSR and for how long; have
the Soviets really adopted live-and-let-live during peace; is
defensive defense real, and what is the role of the Soviet Navy
in a defensive military strategy?
The future of Europe needs to settle from its Kafkaesque
changes before we engage in any negotiations over naval forces.
What changes will the map reflect? Will the superpowers still
have forces deployed to Europe in peacetime? Will NATO alter its
function to guaranteeing security of Europe instead of defending
borders? Will the Warsaw Treaty Organization fold?
On the U.S. side; will we continue a struggle with the USSR
during peacetime if they renounce their goals of world socialism
and communism and adopt a market economy? Will the U.S. withdraw
from Europe? If so, should we continue to act as a world police-
man - or return to isolationism and a purely maritime strategy?
What kind of Navy will be left after budget decisions currently
being made take effect, and how will that constrain the objec-
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tives and goals we can attempt to achieve, let alone the strate-
gies that could be pursued?
If we accept those goals of arms control, we should note
that unilateral actions taken by the superpowers are achieving
the desired results - without the necessity for any formal agree-
ments. The risk is low of a major war involving the superpowers
or their Allies, and continues to decline. Nevertheless, the
consequences of war, if one were to break out, are much reduced
due to the demobilization of personnel and dismantling or moth-
balling of forces. The final goal of arms control, reduction of
military costs, is a given.
As long as we are enjoying the goals of arms control without
formal negotiations and treaties, there is no reason to compli-
cate the process. Until we fully understand the internal changes
in Mikhail Gorbachev's emerging "restructured" Soviet Union,
there is be nothing so threatening about the political/military
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